The great diversification and its undoing by Vasco Carvalho & Xavier Gabaix
The Great Diversiﬁcation and its Undoing∗
Vasco M. Carvalho Xavier Gabaix
October 25, 2010
Abstract
We investigate the hypothesis that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are primitively the
results of many microeconomic shocks, and show that it has signiﬁcant explanatory
power for the evolution of macroeconomic volatility. We deﬁne “fundamental” volatility
as the volatility that would arise from an economy made entirely of idiosyncratic micro-
economic shocks, occurring primitively at the level of sectors or ﬁrms. In its empirical
construction, motivated by a simple model, the sales share of diﬀerent sectors vary over
time (in a way we directly measure), while the volatility of those sectors remains con-
stant. We ﬁnd that fundamental volatility accounts for the swings in macroeconomic
volatility in the US and the other major world economies in the past half century. It
accounts for the “great moderation” and its undoing. Controlling for our measure of
fundamental volatility, there is no break in output volatility. The initial great modera-
tion is due to a decreasing share of manufacturing between 1975 and 1985. The recent
rise of macroeconomic volatility is due to the increase of the size of the ﬁnancial sector.
We provide a model to think quantitatively about the large comovement generated by
idiosyncratic shocks. As the origin of aggregate shocks can be traced to identiﬁable
microeconomic shocks, we may better understand the origins of aggregate ﬂuctuations.
(JEL: E32, E37)
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11 Introduction
This paper explores the hypothesis that changes in the microeconomic composition of the
economy during the post-war period can account for the “great moderation” and its unraveling,
both in the US and in the other major world economies. We call “fundamental volatility”
the volatility that would be derived only from microeconomic shocks. If aggregate shocks
come in large part from microeconomic shocks (augmented by ampliﬁcation mechanisms),
then aggregate volatility should track fundamental volatility. To operationalize this idea, the
k e yq u a n t i t yw ec o n s i d e r( w h i c hc o n s t i t u t e so n ed eparture from other studies) is the following













where Sit is the gross output (not just value added) of sector i,a n dσi is the standard deviation
of the total factor productivity (TFP) in the sector. Note that the evolution of σFt will only
reﬂect the changing weights of diﬀerent sectors in the economy, as micro-level TFP volatility is
held constant through time. Notice also that in this measure the weights do not add up to one.
These are the “Domar weights” that research in productivity studies (Domar 1961, Hulten
1978) has identiﬁed as the proper weights to study the impact of microeconomic shocks.
Figure 1 plots σFt for the US. We see a local peak around 1975, then a fall (due to the
decline of a handful of manufacturing sectors), followed by a new rise (which we will relate
to the rise of ﬁnance). This looks tantalizingly like the evolution of the volatility of US GDP
growth. Indeed, we show statistically that the volatility of the innovations to GDP is well
explained by the fundamental volatility σFt. In particular, our measure explains the great
moderation: the existence of a break in the volatility of US GDP growth around 1984. After
controlling for fundamental volatility, there is no break in GDP volatility. Our measure also
accounts for the rise in GDP volatility, as ﬁnance became large from the mid 1990s onward,
creating an increase in fundamental volatility.
In Figure 2 we present a similar analysis for the major economies for which we could
get disaggregated data about shares and TFP movements: Japan, Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom. The results also indicate that fundamental volatility tracks GDP volatility.
Our conclusion is that fundamental volatility appears to be a quite useful explanatory
construct. It provides an operational way to understand the evolution of volatility, and sheds
more light on the origins of the latter.
Hence, our paper may bring us closer to a concrete understanding of the origin of macro-
2economic shocks. What causes aggregate ﬂuctuations? It has proven convenient to think
about aggregate productivity shocks, but their origin is mysterious: what is the common
high-frequency productivity shock that aﬀects Wal-Mart and Boeing? This is why various
economists have progressively developed the hypothesis that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations can
be traced back to microeconomic ﬂuctuations. This literature includes Long and Plosser
(1983), who proposed a baseline multi-sector model. Its implementation is relatively complex,
as it requires sector sizes that are constant over time (unlike the evidence we rely on), and the
use of input-output matrices. Horvath (1998, 2000) perhaps made the greatest strides toward
developing these ideas empirically, in the context of a rich model with dynamic linkages. The
richness of the model might make it diﬃcult to see what drives its empirical features, and
certainly prevents the use of a simple concept like the concept of fundamental volatility. Du-
por (1999) disputes that the origins of shocks can be microeconomic, on the grounds of the
law of large numbers: if there is a large number of sectors, aggregate volatility should vanish
proportionally to the square root of the number of sectors. Hence, Horvath’s result would
stem from poorly disaggregated data. Carvalho (2009), taking a network perspective on sec-
toral linkages, shows that the presence of hub-like, general-purpose inputs, can undo the law
of large numbers argument and enable microeconomic shocks to aﬀect aggregate volatility1.
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) show how this perspective leads to volatility
cascades.
Gabaix (2011) points out that “sectors” may be arbitrary constructs, and the fat-tailed Zipf
distribution of ﬁrms (or perhaps very disaggregated sectors) necessarily leads to a high amount
of aggregate volatility coming from microeconomic shocks, something he dubs the “granular”
hypothesis. In that view, microeconomic ﬂuctuations create a fat-tailed distribution of ﬁrms
or sectors (Simon 1955, Gabaix 1999, Luttmer 2007). In turn, the large ﬁrms or sectors
coming from that fat-tailed distribution create GDP ﬂuctuations. Gabaix also highlights the
conceptual usefulness of the notion of fundamental volatility. Di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2009) show how that perspective helps explain the volatility of trade ﬂuctuations across
countries.
Against this backdrop, we use a simple way to cut through the complexity of the situation,
and rely on a simple, transparent microeconomic construct, fundamental volatility, to predict
an important macroeconomic quantity, GDP volatility.
By bringing fundamental volatility into the picture, we contribute to the literature on the
1Interesting other conceptual contributions for the micro origins of macro shocks include Bak et al. (1993),
Jovanovic (1987), Durlauf (1993), and Nirei (2006).
3origins of the “great moderation,” a term coined by Stock and Watson (2002): the decline
in the volatility of US output growth around 1984, up until about 2007 and the ﬁnancial
crisis. The initial contributions (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000, Blanchard and Simon
2001) diagnosed the decline in volatility, and conjectured that some basic explanations (in-
cluding sectoral shifts — to which we will come back) did not seem promising. Perhaps better
inventory management (Irvine and Schuh 2005) or better monetary policy (Clarida, Gali and
Gertler 2000) were prime candidates. However, given the diﬃculty of relating those notions
to data, much of the discussion was conjectural. Later, more full-ﬂedged theories of the great
moderation have been advanced. Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian (2007) attribute the changes
in volatility to changes in TFP volatility within a one-sector model. Our work sheds light on
the observable microeconomic origins of this change in TFP volatility. Justiniano and Prim-
iceri (2008) demonstrate that much of the great moderation could be traced back to a change
in the volatility of the investment demand function. Gali and Gambetti (2009) document a
change in both the volatility of initial impulses and the impulse-response mechanism. Com-
pared to those studies, we use much more disaggregated data, which allows us to calculate
the fundamental volatility of the economy. Because we use richer disaggregated data, we can
obviate some of the more heavy artillery of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models, and have a parsimonious toolkit to think about volatility. We defer the discussion of
Jaimovich and Siu (2009) to Section 6.2. We view our proposal as complementary to those
other mechanisms presented in the literature.
Finally, we relate to the literature on technological diversiﬁcation and its eﬀects on aggre-
gate volatility. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Koren and Tenreyro (2007) have shown that
cross-country variation in the degree of technological diversiﬁcation helps explain cross-country
variation in GDP volatility and its relation with the level of development of an economy. Here
we concentrate on the time series dimension of this mechanism and show how it can generate
the observed long swings in volatility for a given economy. We also diﬀer in that we build our
measures of diversiﬁcation and sectoral level volatility from microeconomic TFP accounting
rather than from unspeciﬁed sectoral shocks2.
The methodological principle of this paper is to use as simple and transparent an approach
2The recent contributions of Koren and Tenreyro (2009) and Moro (2009) provide quantitative models -
of, respectively, technological diversiﬁcation and structural change - that generate a decline of volatility that
is consistent with empirical evidence. However, they do not contemplate the possibility of a reversal of these
patterns. We instead show, through our fundamental volatility construct, that such a reversal is present and
is key to explaining the recent period of higher volatility. See also Caselli et al (2010) for an analysis of how
increased trade openness contributed to diversiﬁcation of cost shocks.
4as possible. In particular, we ﬁnd a way to avoid the use of the input-output matrix, which
has no claim to be stable over time, and is not necessary in our framework. We examine
the economics through a very simple two-period model, rather than an inﬁnite-horizon DSGE
model. Useful as they are for a host of macroeconomic questions, those models have many
free parameters, and we ﬁnd it instructive to focus our attention on a zero-free parameter
construct, the fundamental volatility of the economy. This said, a potentially fruitful next
step is to build a DSGE model on the many sectors in the economy.
Section 2 presents a very simple framework that motivates our concept of fundamental
volatility and its implementation. Section 3 summarizes the basic empirical results. Section
4 presents a brief history of fundamental volatility. Section 5 discusses how the role of cor-
relation in the business cycle, and why previous analyses were pessimistic about the role of
microeconomic shocks. Section 6 expands on a variety of points, including the use of value
added vs. sales, ﬁrms vs. sectors, and other robustness checks. Section 7 concludes on the role
of policy and the use of fundamental volatility as an early warning system. The Appendices
provide an account of the data and procedures we employ, as well as the proofs.
2 Framework and Motivation
In this section, we present a simple multisector model that exposes the basic ideas and mo-
tivates our empirical work. There are n sectors that produce intermediate and ﬁnal goods,
and two primitive factors, capital and labor. Sector i uses inputs capital and labor inputs Ki
and Li, and a vector of intermediary inputs Xi =( Xij)j=1...n ∈ Rn:i tu s e saq u a n t i t yXij







,w h e r eFi is homogenous
of degree 1. We call C =( C1,...,C n) and A =( A1,...,A n) the vectors of consumption and
productivity.
The utility function is C (C) − L1+1/φ,w h e r eC is homogenous of degree 1, so that C is
like an aggregate good. Hence, given inputs K and L, the aggregate production function is
deﬁned as:
F (K,L;A) = max
Ci,Li,Ki,Xij
1≤i,j≤n


















Note that this economic structure admits quite general linkages between sectors via the
production functions Fi and the factor markets. The following lemma, whose proof is in the
Appendix, describes some aggregation results in this economy.
















where Si is the dollar value of the gross output of sector i.
Formula (2) is Hulten (1978)’s result. We rewrite it slightly, using the “hat” notation for
fractional changes, 
 Z ≡ dZ/Z,3 and time subscripts. Shocks 
 Ait to the productivity in sector
i result in an aggregate TFP growth 









where Sit is the dollar value of sales (gross output) in sector i,a n dYt is GDP. Sit/Yt is called
the “Domar” weight.
Note that the sum of the weights
N
i=1 Sit/Yt can be greater than 1. This is a well-known
and important feature of models of complementarity. If on average the sales to value added
ratio is 2, and each sector has a TFP increase of 1%, the aggregate TFP increase is 2%.
This eﬀect comes from the fact that a Hicks-neutral productivity shock increases gross output
(sales), not just value added, and has been analyzed by Domar (1961), Hulten (1978), and
Jones (2009).4
3The rules are well known and come from taking the logarithm and diﬀerentiating. For instance,   XαY βZγ =
α 
 X + β
 Y + γ 
 Z.
4The intuition for (3) is the following. Suppose there are just two sectors, say cars (a ﬁnal good, sector 1)
and plastics (both a ﬁnal and an intermediary good, sector 2). Cars use plastics as an intermediary input.
Suppose furthermore there is productivity growth of 
 A1t =1 %in cars and 
 A2t =3 %in plastics. Suppose
that, after the shock, there is no reallocation of factors. We then have 1% more cars in the economy and
3% more plastics. Those goods have not yet been reallocated to production, but still, they have a “social
value,” captured by their price. Hence, if the economy uses the same quantity of factors, GDP has increased
by dYt =1%×initial value of cars + 3%×initial value of plastic, i.e., dYt = S1t × 
 A1t +S2t × 
 A2t. Dividing by






 Ait. However, what has increased is the productive capacity of the economy. So,







 Ait. GDP might increase more or less once we take into
account the response of labor supply, something we shall consider very soon.
6Consider the baseline case where productivity shocks 
 Ait are uncorrelated across i’s, and



















This deﬁnes the “fundamental” volatility, which comes from microeconomic shocks. Gabaix
(2011) calls this the “granular” volatility.
To see the changes in GDP, we assume that capital can be rented at a price r.T h ea g e n t ’ s
consumption is Y − rK with Y =Λ K1−αLα. The competitive equilibrium implements the




1+1/ϕ subject to C =Λ K
1−αL
α − rK.




for an unimportant constant k. Taking logs, lnY =
1+ϕ
α l nΛ+l nk, and a change in TFP 
 Λ







Given that the volatility of TFP is the fundamental volatility σFt, the volatility of GDP is
σGDPt =
1+ϕ
α σFt. We summarize the situation in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The volatility of GDP growth is
σYt= μ · σFt, (5)






Here α is the labor share and ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
O u rh y p o t h e s i si st h a t ,i n d e e d ,σFt explains a substantial part of GDP volatility, as mo-
tivated by (5). In our baseline speciﬁcation, we construct σFt as in equation (4), taking the
sales to value added weights directly from detailed sectoral data provided by Dale Jorgenson
and associates. We use the same data source to compute sectoral TFP growth - by standard
TFP accounting (with intermediate inputs) methods; see for example Jorgenson et al (1987) -
7and then take its standard deviation to obtain σi
5.N o t i c et h a tw ek e e pσi time-independent.
We do this for two reasons. First, Section 6.1 shows that the volatility of TFP does not exhibit
any marked trend at the micro level, and that our results are robust to time-varying volatility.
Second, by using a constant σi, we highlight that the changes in fundamental volatility come
only from changes in the shares of the largest sectors in the economies, rather than from their
volatilities (which would make the explanation run the risk of being circular). We thus explain
time-varying GDP volatility solely with time-varying shares of economic activity within the
economy.
To interpret the results, it is useful to comment on the calibration. We interpret the
elasticity of labor supply broadly, including not only changes in hours worked per employed
worker, but also changes in employment, and changes in eﬀort. Using this notion, recent
research (e.g., summarized in Hall 2009a,b) is consistent with a value of ϕ =2 ,i np a r t
because of the large reaction of employment and eﬀort (as opposed to simply hours worked
per employed worker) to business cycle conditions. Using these values and the labor share of
α =2 /3, we obtain a multiplier of μ =4 .5.
Figure 1 shows the fundamental volatility graphs from 1960 to 2008. We see that funda-
mental volatility and GDP volatility track each other rather well. By 2008 we are already at
mid 1980s levels. This suggests a good correlation between fundamental volatility and GDP
volatility. The next section studies this systematically.




As a baseline measure of cyclical volatility, we ﬁrst obtain deviations from the HP trend of log
quarterly real GDP (smoothing parameter 1600; sample 1947:Q1 to 2009:Q4; source FRED
database). We then compute the standard deviation at quarter t using a rolling window of
10 years (41 quarters, centered around quarter t) In order to extend the period to the latest
5The original data is annual and provides a breakdown of the entire US economy into 88 sectors. Following
much of the sectoral productivity literature we focus on private sector output and drop government sectors.
See Appendix A for further details on the data sources and on the construction of our fundamental volatility
measure.











































Figure 1: Fundamental Volatility and GDP Volatility. The squared line gives the fundamental
volatility (4.5σFt, demeaned). The solid and circle lines are annualized (and demeaned) estimates
of GDP volatility, using respectively a rolling window estimate and an HP trend of instantaneous
volatility.
recession, for 2005:Q1 until 2009:Q4 we use uncentered (i.e., progressively more one-sided)
windows. We refer to this measure as σRoll
Yt .
As a robustness check, we also consider a diﬀerent measure of cyclical volatility, namely
the instantaneous quarterly standard deviation as computed by McConnell and Quiros (2000).
For this measure, we start by ﬁtting an AR(1) model to real GDP growth rates (1960:Q1 until
2008:Q4):
Δyt = ψ + φΔyt−1 +  t (7)
where yt is log GDP. We obtain as estimates ψ =0 .006 (t =6 .78) and φ =0 .292 (t =4 .20).




  t|,w h e r et h ef a c t o r2 converts quarterly volatility into annualized volatility, and the
π












  t| (8)
as the “instantaneous” measure of GDP volatility. We shall also use σHP
Yt, the Hodrick-Prescott
smoothing of the instantaneous volatility σInst
Yt .
9Figure 1 plots the familiar great moderation graphs depicting the halving of volatility in
the mid 1980s. Interestingly, both measures also point to a signiﬁcant increase in volatility
from the early 2000s on, mostly as a result of the recent crisis. It also depicts the sample
ﬁt of our fundamental volatility measure, σFt, for the annual case given a baseline value of
μ =4 .5. In particular, it shows σRoll
Yt and σHP
Yt (annualized and demeaned), together with
4.5σFt (demeaned).
We run least squares regressions of the type:
σYt= a + bσFt+ ηt (9)
where σFt is our measure of fundamental volatility, and σYtis one of the measures of volatility
described above: σRoll
Yt for the rolling window estimate, σInst
Yt for the instantaneous standard
deviation measure. Note that σFt is only available on an annual basis. As such we pursue
two diﬀerent strategies: i) annualizing the standard deviation measure by averaging the left-
hand side over four quarters (“annual” below), or ii) linearly interpolating our measures of
fundamental volatility in order to obtain quarterly frequency data.
Table 1: GDP Volatility and Fundamental Volatility
Annual Data-σRoll
Yt Annual Data- σInst
Yt Quarterly Data- σRoll




















R2 0.60 0.43 0.63 0.13
Notes: Regression of GDP volatility on fundamental volatility: σYt = a + bσFt + ηt.I n
parentheses are t-statistics and standard errors.
Table 1 summarizes the results, at both annual and quarterly frequency. We ﬁnd good
statistical and economic signiﬁcance of σF.6 I ti st h es o l er e g r e s s o r ,a n di t sR2 is around 60%
for the rolling estimate of volatility.7 This shows that σFt explains a good fraction of the
6Our model predicts an intercept a =0 . Simple variants could predict a positive a, or a negative a,a sw e
ﬁnd here empirically. A positive a is generated by adding other shocks to GDP. A negative a is generated if
the multiplier μ is increasing in σF rather than constant, i.e., if the economy’s technologies are more ﬂexible
when the environment is more volatile.
7As a two-step OLS can be ineﬃcient econometrically, we have also performed an ARCH-type maximum-
likelihood estimation, based on the joint system (7) and σt = α + βσFt+ ηt. Its results are very similar to
those in Table 1.
10historical evolution on GDP volatility. Of course, the R2 of σInst
Yt is lower than for σRoll
Yt ,a s
σInst
Yt is a much more volatile measure of GDP volatility.
Note that, in our regressions, all the movements come from the sizes of sectors: their
volatilities are ﬁxed in our construction of σF. We do this for parsimony’s sake, and also
because it is warranted by the evidence: the average volatility of sectoral-level microeconomic
volatility did not have noticeable trends in the sample. Indeed, the average sectoral-level
volatility is 3.4% in the 1960-2005 period, 3.5% in the 1960-1984 period, and 3.2% in the
1984-2005 period. We cannot reject the null of equal mean volatility across the two sample
periods (the p−value is 0.18). Hence, our construction of σF allows to isolate the impact of
the changes in microeconomic composition of the economy.
3.1.2 Accounting for the Break in US GDP Volatility
A common way of quantifying the great moderation is to test the null hypothesis of a constant
level in GDP volatility
σYt= a + ηt
against an alternative representation featuring a break in the level
σYt= a + cDt + ηt
where Dt is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 for periods t ≥ T given an estimated
break date T. Following common practice in the literature (see McConnell and Quiros (2000),
Stock and Watson (2002) and Sensier and van Dijk (2004), we take σYt to be given by the
instantaneous volatility measure σInst
Yt , and test for the presence of a break in level using Bai
and Perron’s (1998) SupLR test statistic8. In what follows, we look for a single break date T,
w h e r ew ea s s u m eT lies in a range [T1,T 2] with T1 =0 .2n and T2 =0 .8n,a n dn is the total
number of observations (i.e., the trimming percentage is set at 20% of the sample).9
To assure comparability and since our sample period does diﬀer, we start by reconﬁrming
the ﬁndings ﬁrst reported in McConnell and Quiros (2000). We do ﬁnd strong support for
a level break with a SupLR statistic of 32.33 (the 5% critical value is 8.75). The estimated
break date T is 1984:1 and is estimated with a 90% conﬁdence interval given by 1981:2—1986:4.
8McConnell and Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002) show that, for U.S. quarterly GDP, one cannot
reject the null of no break in the autoregressive coeﬃcients in the equation for GDP growth, thus enabling us
the residuals in (7) to test for a break in the variance.
9Bai and Perron (2006) ﬁnd that serial correlation can induce signiﬁcant size distortions when low values
of the trimming percentage are used, and recommend values of 15% or higher. We use code made available
by Qu and Perron (2007) to compute the test statistics and obtain critical values.
11The estimated value of c is −0.0104 (t = −5.50), implying a permanent decrease in aggregate
volatility after this date.
Table 2: Break Tests with Fundamental Volatility
Break Test With or Without Fundamental Volatility on the Right-Hand Side
Without With
H0:N ob r e a ki na H0:N oB r e a ki na H0:N oB r e a ki nb H0:N oB r e a ki na,b
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
SupLR stat. 32.33 8.60 8.96 9.33
Null of no break Reject Accept Accept Accept
Est. break date 1984:1 None None None
Notes: We perform a break test for equation σInst
Yt = a + ηt (column i) and σInst
Yt = a +
bσFt+ ηt, the regression of instantaneous GDP volatility on fundamental volatility (columns
ii-iv). Column (i) conﬁrms that, without conditioning on fundamental volatility, there is a
break in GDP volatility (the great moderation). Next, column (ii) performs a test on the a
coeﬃcient. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no break. This means that, once we control
for fundamental volatility, there is no break in GDP volatility. The subsequent tests for breaks
in b and (a,b) are extra robustness checks (columns iii-iv); they conﬁrm the conclusion that,
after controlling for fundamental volatility, there is no break in GDP volatility. From Qu and
Perron (2007), the 5% asymptotic critical values reported for the SupLR statistic are 13.34
for (ii) and (iii), and 11.17 for (iv).
We next test the hypothesis that, once our fundamental volatility measure is accounted for
in the dynamics of σInst
Yt , there is no such level break in aggregate volatility. That is, we test
for the null of no break in the intercept of the equation:10 σInst
Yt = a + bσFt+ ηt. To rule out
the additional possibility that the break in aggregate volatility is the result of a break in its
link with fundamental volatility, we also test the null of no break on the slope parameter b and
the joint null of no break in both a and b.11 To maximize the total number of observations,
10The resulting SupLR test statistic reported in the Table is computed under the assumptions of no serial
correlation in ηt and the same distribution of ηt across segments. The key conclusion (failure to reject the
null of no break in a when we account for fundamental volatility) is unchanged when we relax either or both
of these assumptions.
11When testing for the null of no break in only one of the parameters (either the intercept or the slope), we
are imposing the restriction that there is no break in the other parameter.
12we opt to use a quarterly interpolation of our fundamental volatility measure.
The results are in Table 2. We cannot reject the null of no break in any of these settings.
We conclude that, after controlling for the time series behavior of fundamental volatility, there
is no break in GDP volatility. This is the sense in which fundamental volatility explains the
great moderation (and its undoing): after controlling for the changes in fundamental volatility,
there is no statistical evidence of a residual great moderation.
3.2 International Evidence
We now extend the previous analysis to the four other major economies: France, Japan,
Germany, and the UK. As is well known (see Stock and Watson 2005), these countries have
exhibited quite diﬀerent low-frequency dynamics of GDP volatility throughout the last half-
century. Under the hypothesis of this paper, it should be the case that the evolution of our
measure of fundamental volatility is also heterogenous across these economies.
Relative to the US, we face greater data limitations, along both the time series and cross-
sectional dimensions. We are able to construct the Domar weight measures from 1970 to 2005
(from 1973 for Japan). Though we have considerable sectoral details for nominal measures,
sector-speciﬁc price indexes are only available for half or less of the sectors in each country.12
This renders impossible an accurate weighting by sectoral TFP volatility. Therefore, we choose












where σ is the average standard deviation of sectoral TFP over the entire sample period in the
country under consideration. The values of σ are 2.3% for France, 2.0% for Germany, 3.2%
for Japan, 2.2% for the UK, and 3.4% for the US. Finally, motivated by our discussion above,
we consider a multiplier μ =4 .5 to obtain the volatility of GDP implied by our fundamental
volatility measure, i.e., σYt =4 .5σFt. A si nt h eU Sc a s e ,w et a k ea sab a s e l i n em e a s u r e
of cyclical volatility the 10-year rolling window standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered quarterly
real GDP. Figure 2 compares the evolution of these measures (where we, again, demean both
measures).
As in the US case, our proposed measure seems to account well for the (diﬀerent) low-
frequency movements in GDP volatility in this set of countries. In the UK it captures the
strong reduction in volatility in the late 1970s and its leveling oﬀ until the mid 1990s. We
12See Appendix A for more details on the sources, description, and construction of these measures.




















































































































































Figure 2: GDP Volatility and Fundamental Volatility in Four OECD countries. Solid line: smoothed
rolling window standard deviation of deviations from HP trend of quarterly real GDP. Circle line:
fundamental volatility measure, σYt=4 .5σFt. Both measures are demeaned. We report results for
the four large countries for which we have enough disaggregated data.
14cannot account for the short lived drop in UK volatility around 2000 (but notice that by 2005
the levels of our measure and the data are again very close). As Stock and Watson (2005)
noticed, Germany provides a diﬀerent picture, that of a large but gradual decline. Again,
our measure does well, displaying a much smoother negative trend. For Japan, fundamental
volatility tracks well the fall in GDP volatility in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as
the often noted reversal occurring in the mid 1980s. For France, our measure displays no
discernible trend, hovering around its mean throughout the sample period. This is in line
with the muted low-frequency dynamics of French GDP volatility.









Notes:W er u nt h er e g r e s s i o nσYc t= αc+χt+βσFct+εct,w h e r eσYc tis the country volatility
using a rolling window measure, σFct is the fundamental volatility of the country deﬁned in
(10), αc a country ﬁxed eﬀect and χt al i n e a rt i m et r e n d .t-statistics and standard errors in
parentheses.
To complement this, we consider running panel regressions
σYc t= αc + χt + βσFct+ εct (11)
where σYc t is our rolling window measure of cyclical volatility for country c in year t and
σFct are the country-speciﬁc fundamental volatility measures. We include the US along with
the four other economies mentioned above. To preserve comparability, we construct and use
σFct f o rt h eU S( r a t h e rt h a nσFt described in the previous section). We use country ﬁxed
eﬀects αc, and run the above panel with and without a common linear time trend χt.W e
view the speciﬁcation without a time trend as the cross-country analog of the regressions run
above for the US alone. The speciﬁcation with a time trend allows us to control for potential
common factors aﬀecting volatility in all countries, and therefore identiﬁes β through cross-
country timing diﬀerences in the evolution of fundamental volatility. While this speciﬁcation
renders the value of β not comparable to the values obtained for the simple US regression,
15it strengthens our results by minimizing possible spurious regression type problems in our
baseline speciﬁcation.13
Table 3 reports the results. All results are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (they are also
signiﬁcant without the US). Again, we conﬁrm the existence of a tight link between aggregate
volatility and our fundamental volatility measure. Note that, for the speciﬁcation without a
linear trend, our measure is quantitatively similar in the cross-country case. Its signiﬁcance
s u r v i v e sw h e nw ea l l o wf o ral i n e a rt i m et r e n da n dw h e ni n s t r u m e n t e db yi t so w nl a g .
4 A Brief History of Fundamental Volatility
The previous section has shown that fundamental volatility correlates well with GDP volatility.
In this section, we present a brief account of the evolution of our fundamental volatility


















That is, Hi(t1,t 2) indicates how much of the change in squared fundamental volatility between
t2 and t1 can be explained by the corresponding change in the squared Domar weight of
industry i.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,

i Hi(t1,t 2)=1for all t1  = t2.
4.1 United States
We ﬁnd it useful to break our account of fundamental volatility into three questions: i) What
accounts for the “long and large decline” of fundamental volatility from the 1960s to the early
1990s? ii) What accounts for the interruption of this trend from the mid 1970s to the early
1980s? iii) What is behind the reversal of fundamental volatility dynamics observed around
the mid 1990s and its subsequent increase until 2008?
Our answers are the following: i) The long and large decline of fundamental volatility from
the 1960s to the early 1990s is due to the smaller size of a handful of heavy manufacturing
sectors. ii) The growth of the oil sector (which itself can be traced to the rise of the oil price)
accounts for the burst of volatility in the mid 1970s. iii) The increase in the size of the ﬁnancial
13We report heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors by using a Newey-West estimator
with 2 lags.
14See Jorgenson and Timmer (forth.) for another analysis of structural change.











16sector is an important determinant of the increase in fundamental volatility. We now detail
our answers.
The low-frequency decline in fundamental volatility observed from 1960 to 1990 can be
accounted for almost entirely by the demise of a handful of heavy manufacturing sectors:
Construction, Primary Metals, Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery (excluding Comput-
ers), and Motor Vehicles.16 While only moderately large in a value-added sense in 1960 —
accounting for 18% of total value added in 1960 —, these sectors are both relatively more
intensive intermediate input users and relatively more volatile, thus accounting for a dispro-
portionately large fraction of aggregate fundamental volatility in 1960 (30% of σ2
F).17 In this
sense, the relatively high aggregate volatility in the early 1960s was the result of an undiver-
siﬁed technological portfolio, loading heavily on a few heavy manufacturing industries. Their
demise, starting around the early 1970s and accelerating around 1980, meant that by 1990
they accounted for only 10% of aggregate volatility.
Another way to see this is to compute a counterfactual fundamental volatility measure
where we ﬁx the Domar weights of these sectors to their sample average, while using the
actual, time-varying Domar weights for the other sectors. This enables us to ask what would
have happened to fundamental volatility had these sectors not declined during the period of
analysis. We ﬁnd (see Figure 3) that in this counterfactual economy the level of fundamental
volatility would have barely changed from the early 1960s to the early 1990s. At the same
time, it is also clear that the dynamics of these sectors do not account either for the spike in
fundamental volatility around 1980 nor do they play a role in its continued rise from the mid
1990s onwards.
Instead, we ﬁnd that the spectacular rise and precipitous decline in fundamental volatility
from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s are largely accounted for by the dynamics of two energy-
related sectors: Oil and Gas Extraction, and Petroleum and Coal Products: the H (1971,1980)
of these sectors is 0.64 and 0.30, respectively. By 1981, these two sectors accounted for 41% of
fundamental volatility, a fourfold increase from the average over the remainder of the sample.
The decline of these two sectors also accounts for the bulk of the fall in fundamental volatility
during the 1980-1986 period (H (1980,1986) = 0.55 and 0.24).
To analyze the rise in fundamental volatility since the mid 1990s, we build on Philip-
pon’s (2008) analysis of the evolution of the GDP share of the ﬁnancial sector, but revisit it
16Between 1960 and 1989, their H is 0.58. The main drivers are Construction (H =0 .36) and Primary
Metals (H =0 .12).
17The share of σ2







F. Those shares add up to 1.














































































Figure 3: Left: Weight of heavy manufacturing sectors in σ2
Ft. Right: The continuous line is the
baseline fundamental volatility measure (4.5σFt demeaned). The circled line gives a counterfactual
volatility measure (also demeaned) where weights of heavy manufacturing sectors are ﬁxed at their
sample average.























































































Figure 4: Left: Weight of ﬁnance-related sectors in σ2
Ft. Right: The continuous line is the baseline
fundamental volatility measure (4.5σFt demeaned). The circled line gives a counterfactual volatility
measure (also demeaned) where weights of ﬁnance-related sectors are ﬁxed at their sample average.
18through the metric of fundamental volatility. We ﬁnd that the combined contribution of three
ﬁnance-related sectors — Depository Institutions, Non-Depository Financial Institutions (in-
cluding Brokerage Services and Investment Banks), and Insurance — to fundamental volatility
increased tenfold from the early 1980s to the 2000s, with the latest of these sharp movements
occurring in the mid 1990s and coinciding with the rise of our fundamental volatility measure
(H(1990,2007) is 0.44 for Non-Depository Financial Institutions and 0.19 for Depository In-
stitutions). From the late 1990s onward, these three sectors have accounted for roughly 20%
of fundamental volatility.
In a counterfactual economy where the weights of these sectors are held ﬁxed, fundamental
volatility would have prolonged its trend decline until the early 2000s (see Figure 4). While the
renewed exposure to energy-related sectors from the mid-2000s onwards would have reversed
this trend somewhat, the implied level of fundamental volatility at the end of the sample
would have been lower, in line with that observed in the early 1990s (and not that of the early
1960s and 1970s as our baseline measure implies). The rise of ﬁnance is thus key to explaining
the undoing of the great moderation from the mid 1990s onwards: as the US economy loaded
more and more on these sectors, fundamental volatility rose, reﬂecting a return to a relatively
undiversiﬁed portfolio of sectoral technologies.
We next turn to our four other major economies.
4.2 United Kingdom
The UK time series starts oﬀ with a short-term spike in fundamental volatility between 1972
and 1976 which is almost single-handedly explained by the high-frequency developments for
Petroleum and Coal Products, yielding H(1972,1976) = 0.59. Thereafter, we see a large
decline from 1978 until the mid/late 1980s, again mostly explained by Petroleum and Coal
Products (H(1978,1988) = 0.61). As can be seen in Figure 2, fundamental volatility stabilizes
in 1985 and then gradually increases until 2005. A large portion of that surge in fundamental
volatility can be attributed to Construction, whose share H(1985,2005) is 0.41.
The rise of the ﬁnance sector also contributes to the modest but continuous rise in fun-
damental volatility since 2000: the combined H(2000,2005) for Financial Intermediation and
Insurance equals 0.46.
194.3 Japan
The most salient characteristic of the Japanese time series is the steep decline in fundamental
volatility from 1970 to 1987. The decline of the steel industry and construction explains the
development in fundamental volatility very well: H(1970,1987) = 0.57 and 0.33 for Basic
Metals and Construction, respectively. Despite the decline from 1970 to 1987, fundamental
volatility reaches very high levels in the 1970s, especially compared to Germany and France.
The prominent role of the steel industry also explains this pattern of short-term spikes with
H(1973,1974) = 0.64 and H(1978,1980) = 0.23 for Basic Metals, and H(1978,1980) = 0.23
for Construction. Finally, the sharp increase in fundamental volatility from 1987 to 1990 can
be attributed to Construction, whose H(1987,1990) is 1.02.
4.4 Germany
The major trend in the German time series of fundamental volatility is the latter’s downturn
from 1970 to 1987 which is very well explained by the drop in GDP shares for Basic Metals
(mostly steel) and Construction: the respective values for H(1970,1987) are 0.73 and 0.57.
Furthermore, the downturn of fundamental volatility during the 1980s can in part be explained
by Petroleum and Coal Products, with H(1981,1988) = 0.19.
4.5 France
T h eF r e n c ht i m es e r i e sc a nb es p l i ta sf o l l o w s :ad e c l i n ei nf u n d a m e n t a lv o l a t i l i t yf r o m1 9 7 0
to 1987/8, followed by a ten-year sequence of hardly any movement, and a steep increase from
1998 to 2005. Construction heavily contributes to this drop (H(1970,1987) = 0.50), and is
accompanied by Petroleum and Coal Products in the 1980s (H(1981,1988) = 0.23). Lastly,
the steep increase in fundamental volatility since 1998 is due to “other business activities,”
which contains the bulk of business services. This category comprises heterogenous activities,
ranging from operative services such as security activities to services requiring highly qualiﬁed
human capital.
205 Idiosyncratic Shocks and Comovement
5.1 Motivation and Summary
We next discuss how our results are consistent with comovement in the economy. We need






 Yi,a n di t s
variance can be decomposed as:
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The term Dt represents the diagonal terms in GDP growth, while the term Nt represents the
non-diagonal terms, i.e., in an accounting sense, the terms that come from common shocks or
from linkages in the economy.
In this section, we address why previous research was pessimistic about the importance
of microeconomic shocks (Blanchard and Simon 2001, McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000,
Stock and Watson 2002), and answer the following questions. (i) Previous research showed
that comovement (the Nt term) accounts for the bulk of GDP volatility, so why focus on the
diagonal terms? (ii) Previous literature showed that the oﬀ-diagonal Nt terms fell in volatility,
doesn’t that mean that the common shock they reﬂect is the main story (see, for instance,
Stiroh 2009)? (iii) Don’t we also detect comovement of TFP across sectors, which must mean
that there is an extra common factor to take into account?
Before laying out the model that helps think about those questions, we present a summary
of our answers. (i) We present a model with comovement in which all the primitive shocks are
idiosyncratic (at the sector level). However, because of linkages, there is comovement. Indeed,
to a good approximation, in this model
Dt   cDσ
2
Ft,N t   cNσ
2
Ft (14)
for two coeﬃcients cD and cN. In our calibration, like in data, about 90% of the variance of
output is indeed due to comovement (Nt/σ2
Y   0.9). That comovement itself comes entirely
from the primitive diagonal shocks whose variance is measured by σ2
Ft. Hence, the oﬀ-diagonal
terms are just the shadow of the primitive shocks, which are the diagonal terms captured by
σ2
Ft.
(ii) In terms of time-series evolution, in our hypothesis the prime mover is the change in
σ2
Ft, which comes from sectoral-level shares. By linkages, the oﬀ-diagonal terms Nt will reﬂect
21those changes. The fact that the magnitude of oﬀ-diagonal terms changes simply reﬂects the
fact that the primitive shocks captured by σ2
Ft change.18
(iii) In our model, all primitive shocks are idiosyncratic. Hence, TFP movements across
sectors are uncorrelated. However, even small measurement errors will create a comovement
in measured TFP. Suppose that, when times are good (i.e., when the average idiosyncratic
shock is positive), people work more, but this partly comes as higher eﬀort, so that mea-
sured employment underestimates the true increase in labor supply. Each ﬁrm will look more
productive than it really is. There will be a measured common productivity increase, but it
is only due to mismeasurement. Quantitatively, our model shows that a small measurement
error can account for the observed comovement in measured TFP.
We next proceed to the model that allows us to reach the above conclusions.
5.2 Model Setup
To think quantitatively about comovement, we specify the model of Section 2. We use a CES
production function for one ﬁnal good.19 Thus, we can solve the structure of this economy in
closed form, and quantify its comovement. Our model diﬀers in a series of small ways from
Long and Plosser (1983), Horvath (1998, 2000), Shea (2002), Foerster, Sarte, and Watson
(2008), and Carvalho (2009).20 I t sm a i nv i r t u ei st h a ti ti ss o l v a b l ei nc l o s e df o r m ,s ot h a tt h e
mechanisms are fairly transparent.
There is an aggregate good and n intermediary goods. Unit i uses Li,K i,X i of labor,











with κ =1 /

bb (1 − b)
1−b

,a n db is the share of intermediate inputs and will also be the ratio
18However, in the model of Section 5, the fall in fundamental volatility will make all sectors’ volatilities fall,






 Yit fall in variance, keeping constant output
shares (Yi/Y)
∗ but using the observed shocks 
 Yit. (A more analytical note on this point is available upon
request.)
19In the CES world that we parameterize (with positive elasticity of substitution), a positive TFP shock
increases a sector’s size. This is not necessarily a good thing. When a sector is very new (say electronic
gadgets), the size of that sector grows as the sector becomes more productive (that is, as more products are
invented). However, perhaps in a long run sense, some sectors shrink as they become very productive (e.g.,
agriculture). Following the macro tradition, we eschew here a calibrated modeling of this heterogeneity in the
link between productivity and size.
20Long and Plosser (1983) impose a Cobb-Douglas structure, with zero idiosyncratic movement in the sales
per employee and dollar sales.
22of value added to sales, both at the level of the unit and of the economy. GDP is production
















i )ψ and the
intermediary inputs is made by a competitive fringe of ﬁrms.
The representative agent’s utility function is U = Y − L1+1/ϕ. Capital can be rented at




Li = L. We assume that the prices equal marginal cost. This could be caused
by competition or by an input subsidy equal to ψ for the intermediary ﬁrms.
The model gives:























5.3 Comovement in Output
To study comovement, we assume that we start from a steady state equilibrium, and study
the one-shot response of our economy to shocks.
Models such as (15) always deliver a Sales/Employees ratio that is independent of the
unit’s productivity. The reason for this almost surely counterfactual prediction is that labor
is assumed to be costlessly adjustable. To capturet h er e a l i s t i cc a s eo fl a b o ra d j u s t m e n tc o s t s ,
we assume that a fraction 1 − ν of labor is a quasi-ﬁxed factor, in the sense of Oi (1962).
Technically, we represent Li = Lν
V,iL
1−ν
F,i ,w h e r eLV,i and LF,i are respectively the variable part
of labor and the quasi-ﬁxed part of labor. After a small shock, only LV,i adjusts. The disutility
of labor remains L1+1/ϕ,w h e r eL = Lν
VL
1−ν
F is aggregate labor. We assume that capital and
intermediary inputs are ﬂexible. The Online Appendix relaxes that assumption.
One can now study the eﬀect of a productivity shock 
 Ai to each unit i.W ec a l lSi = piQi
the dollar sales of unit i. The next proposition, whose proof is in the Online Appendix (which
contains a generalization to the case where all factors have ﬁnite elasticity), describes how the
economy reacts to microeconomic shocks.
23Proposition 2 (Aggregate factor emerging from microeconomic shocks) Suppose that each
unit i receives a productivity shock 
 Ai. Macroeconomic variables change according to


























and microeconomic-level variables change according to
Dollar sales and dollar value added : 
 Si = 
 Yi = β 
 Ai + Φ
 Y (22)
Production : 
 Qi = ψβ 
 Ai +( 1− ψΦ) 
 Y (23)
Price : 
 pi = −(ψ − 1)β 
 Ai +( ψ − 1)βΦ
 Y (24)
Employment : 









Use of intermediary inputs and capital : 
 Xi = 








, Φ=1− Φ (27)
In other terms, this economy exhibits a common factor 
 Y (equations 22-26) which is itself
nothing but a sum of idiosyncratic shocks (equation 20).
The new results are the sectoral-level changes, in equations (22)-(26). The economy be-
haves like a one-factor model with an “aggregate shock,” the GDP factor 
 Y .A g a i n ,t h i sf a c t o r
stems from a multitude of idiosyncratic shocks (equation 20).21 It causes all microeconomic-
level quantities to comove. Economically, when sector i h a sap o s i t i v es h o c k ,i tm a k e st h e
aggregate economy more productive and aﬀects the other sectors in three diﬀerent ways. First,
other sectors can use more intermediary inputs produced by sector i, thereby increasing their
production. Second, sector i demands more inputs from the other ﬁrms (equation 22), which
leads their production to increase. Third, given that sector i commands a large share of out-
put, it will use more of the inputs of the economy, which tends to reduce the other sectors’
output. The net eﬀect depends on the magnitudes of the elasticities.
We calibrate the model using conventional parameters to the extent possible, with parame-
ters summarized in Table 4. Using the decomposition (13), the ratio fGDP ≡ N/σ2
Y captures
how much of GDP variance is due to comovement.
21In this economy, ﬁrms are aﬀected by this GDP factor, but this GDP factor is entirely made of ﬁrm-level
shocks. That makes identiﬁcation very diﬃcult. It’s an instance of the “reﬂection problem” identiﬁed by
Manski (1993). It has no general solution, but some of the partial techniques generated by Manski’s impulse
might be useful to identify causality in the type of macroeconomic equilibrium described by Proposition 2.
24Table 4: Model Calibration
Calibrated Values
Labor share α =2 /3
O n em i n u ss h a r eo fi n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t s b =1 /2
Elasticity of labor supply ϕ =2
Product diﬀerentiation parameter ψ =1 .2
Share of labor that is variable in the short run ν =1 /2
Fraction of mismeasured temporary labor utilization θ =0 .43
Resulting Values
Micro-level productivity multiplier β =2 .7
Aggregate productivity multiplier μ =4 .5
Elasticitity Φ Φ=0 .3
Fraction of GDP variance attributed to comovement fGDP =0 .90
Fraction of employment variance attributed to comovement fLabor =0 .95
Fraction of measured TFP variance attributed to comovement fTFP,m =0 .59
Notes: The ﬁrst part of the table shows the postulated values. The second part shows the
resulting values for a few quantities. Because of linkages, the fraction of variances attributed
to comovement is non-zero although all primitive shocks are assumed to be idiosyncratic.
Proposition 3 (Magnitude of the comovement in output and employment) Call fGDP (resp.
fLabor) the fraction of GDP (resp. employment) variance attributed to comovement in a
variance-accounting sense. An exact value is given in equation (36) of the Appendix. If
most shocks are idiosyncratic at the micro level (β
2σ2























and we have (14) with cD   b2β
2 and cN   μ2 − b2β
2. However, economically, all the shocks
are primitively idiosyncratic.
Of course, as μ (deﬁned in equation 6) increases, so does the fraction attributed to co-
movement. Using our calibration, we ﬁnd fGDP = 90% and fLabor = 95%. T h i si st os a y
that, even though primitive shocks are purely idiosyncratic in our model, linkages create such
a large comovement that, in a volatility-accounting sense, 93% are mechanically attributed
to comovement. This measure is congruent with the empirical ﬁndings of Shea (2002), who
25ﬁnds estimates of fGDP in the range 80%-85% and fLabor = 95%. It might also explain
why Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2008) ﬁnd that a large part of ﬂuctuations come from the
non-diagonal part, Nt.
5.4 Comovement in Measured TFP
The data show a positive correlation (average pairwise correlation is 2.3%) in measured TFP
i n n o v a t i o n sa c r o s ss e c t o r s . T h ep r e v i o u sm o d e lg e n e r a t e sp o s i t i v ec o m o v e m e n tf r o mi n d e -
pendent TFP shocks. Hence, if there is perfect measurement of TFP, it will generate no
comovement of TFP. Against this background, we interpret the data in the following way.
We say that a fraction θ of the change in the eﬀective number of hours is not measured. For
instance, a secretary will work harder when there is much work to do, and less intensely when
there is less work. Still, the total number of hours that are counted is the same, say 40 hours
per week. In that case, θ =1 . If she does some overtime, so that some of her extra eﬀorts
appear in the labor supply statistics, then θ<1. For simplicity, we assume that only labor is
mismeasured (the same argument would go through if more factors were mismeasured). The
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 Ai + θbα
 Li. (29)
In other terms, the measured TFP is the true TFP plus the increase in eﬀective labor 
 Li times
labor share in output-cum-intermediary-inputs bα times the mismeasurement factor θ.
In this benchmark economy, the comovement in true productivity growth 
 Ai is 0. However,
there will be some comovement in measured productivity growth, as all sectors tend to increase
factor utilization (in a partially unmeasured way) during booms. The following proposition
quantiﬁes this.





i = cA 
 Ai + cY 
 Y, (30)





. Hence, if there is mismeasurement, mea-
sured TFP covaries. Call fTFP,m the fraction of measured TFP variance attributed to comove-










Note that, if there is no mismeasurement (θ =0 ), cY =0and fTFP,m =0 :t h e r ei sn o
comovement in TFP.
Empirically, we measure fTFP,m =0 .59 in US data. Solving for θ in equation (31), this
corresponds to θ = 43% of the variable labor input being undermeasured. It says that, if from
trough to boom measured hours go up by 5.7%,e ﬀ o r tg o e su p4.3%.22 The corresponding
value of σm
F /σF is simply cA =1 .19. So, mismeasurement of inputs aﬀects a lot the apparent
comovement between sectors (as it is the cause of comovement, and the productivity multiplier
is large), but only relatively little the measurement of sectoral-level productivity (idiosyncratic
factors generally dominate aggregate factors at the microeconomic level). In our model, all
primitive shocks come from idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks, but there is comovement
in output because of production linkages. In other terms, there is positive comovement in
measured TFP because statistical agencies do not control well for unmeasured increases in
labor inputs, i.e., “eﬀort” or “utilization.”
We wish to conclude that our model simply illustrates important quantitative features
of an economy with comovement. We suspect that the highlighted features will survive with
other sources of comovement, e.g., a ﬁnancial accelerator or expectations.
6 Robustness Checks and Extensions
6.1 Variants in the Empirical Constructs
6.1.1 Sectors vs. Firms
In this paper, we primarily use sectors, becau s ew eh a v em e a s u r e so fg r o s so u t p u ta n dv a l u e
added for sectors in several countries. The ﬁrm-level data are spottier, yet encouraging as
we shall see. We start with ﬁrms in the US, using the Compustat data set. We deﬁne the
ﬁrm-based fundamental volatility as we did for sectors, cf. (1). To implement this formula,
Compustat has several limitations which are rather important when studying long-run trends.










Figure 5: Firm-based Fundamental Volatility and GDP Volatility. The solid line gives the
GDP volatility, σRoll
Yt (demeaned). The dotted and dashed lines give the fundamental volatility
based on ﬁrms (rather than sectors), 4.5σFirms
F (demeaned). The dotted line is based on the
largest 100 ﬁrms by sales in each year. The dashed line is based on all ﬁrms in Compustat.
It is not quite consistent over time, as it covers more and more ﬁrms. Additionally, the data
are on worldwide sales, rather than domestic output. There are some data on domestic sales,
which are unfortunately too spotty to be used.
For ﬁrm-level volatility, a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm estimation gives quite volatile numbers, so we pro-
ceed as in the international section of this paper, using constant values of σi across ﬁrms. We
use σi = 12%, the typical volatility of sales/employees, sales and employee growth found in
Gabaix (2011).
Figure 5 plots the detrended ﬁrm-level fundamental volatility for the top 100 ﬁrms and
for all ﬁrms in the data set. As the top 100 ﬁrms are very large, most of the variation in
σFirms
F is driven by them. We see that they track GDP volatility quite well. We also see that
ﬁrm-based fundamental volatility and GDP volatility have a similar evolution.
To be more quantitative, we proceed as in Table 1 and regress σYt= a + bσFirms
Ft .W eﬁ n d
ac o e ﬃ c i e n tb =4 .8 (s.e. 0.8)f o rσRoll
Yt and yearly data, with an R2 equal to 0.44. We also
replicate the break test of Table 2. Controlling for σFirms
Ft , there is no break in GDP volatility
at the conventional conﬁdence level. We conclude that the ﬁrm-based fundamental volatility
does account for the great moderation and its undoing, just like the sector-based fundamental
volatility we use in the rest of the paper.
The chief diﬃculty is for non-US data. For European countries the main data set is
Amadeus. Unfortunately, it starts only in 1996, which is too short a time period to detect
28the long-run trends that are the key object of this paper. We can only hope that a researcher
will compile a historical database of the actions of the top ﬁrms in the major economies. We
conjecture that going to more disaggregated data would enrich the economic understanding
of microeconomic developments (e.g., the big productivity growth of the retail sector was due
to Wal-Mart, rather than a mysterious shock aﬀecting a whole sector), but data availability
prevents us from pursuing that idea in this paper.
6.1.2 Correlations in TFP Innovations
We proceed as if TFP innovations are uncorrelated. This is a good benchmark, as the average
correlation in TFP innovations in diﬀerent sectors is only 2.3% in the US. Even that small
correlation could be due to measurement error and factor hoarding, as seen in Section 5.4.







Yt σiσjρij. The results are quite similar,
as detailed in the Online Appendix. We prefer our σFt with only diagonal terms, as it is more
parsimonious conceptually and empirically.
6.1.3 Time-Varying Sectoral Volatility
Our σFt uses a constant sectoral volatility — largely for the sake of parsimony. We examine
that benchmark here. First, we ﬁnd that micro TFP volatility is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent pre
and post 1984: its average is 3.49% for 1960-1983 and 3.16% for 1984-2005, and the diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant. This warrants the benchmark of constant micro volatility.
Another way to explore whether our results depend on time-varying sectoral volatility is





it, i.e., σFt with time-varying sectoral volatility while keeping






time-varying shares and volatility. We estimate σit by running a GARCH(1,1) for each sector
i. We re-run the regression (9) with σInst
Y and σRoll
Y on the right-hand side: σ 
Fthas insigniﬁcant
explanatory power and a very low R2 (about 0.05). On the other hand, σ  
Ft has signiﬁcant
explanatory power and a good R2 (about 0.38). We conclude that the crucial explanatory
factor is indeed the time-varying shares in the economy, not a potential change in sectoral-level
volatility.
6.1.4 Gross vs. Net output
In this paper, we use the concept of gross output, rather than net output (i.e., value added).
In that we follow the common best practice of the productivity literature (e.g., Basu, Fernald
29and Kimball 2006). Part of the reason is data availability, part is conceptual: most models use
inputs such as labor, capital, and other goods (the intermediary inputs), and for productivity
there is no good reason to subtract the intermediary inputs.23 Nonetheless, we did examine
our results with a value-added productivity notion. We found them to be quite similar.
6.2 Time-Varying Elasticity of Labor Supply
Jaimovich and Siu (JS, 2009) ﬁnd that changes in the composition of the labor force account
for part of the movement in GDP volatility across the G7 countries. As the young have a
more elastic labor supply, the aggregate labor supply elasticity should be increasing in the
fraction of the labor force who is between 15 and 29 years old — which is the JSt variable.
Table 5: Fundamental Volatility and Jaimovic-Siu Variable
























χt No Yes No Yes
Observations 134 134 134 134





where σYc t is the country volatility using a rolling window measure, σFct is the fundamental
volatility of the country deﬁned in (10), σF is the mean of the σFct’s, JSct is the Jaimovich-
Siu (2009) measure of the labor force share of the “volatile age group,” JS is the mean of
the JSct’s, αc a country ﬁxed eﬀect and χt a linear time trend. t-statistics and Newey-West
standard errors (2 lags) in parentheses.
In terms of our model in (5)-(6), this corresponds to having a time-varying Frisch elasticity
23To think about the problem, take a gross output production function F (L,X): the inputs are labor and
an intermediary input X, the net output is V (L,X)=F (L,X). A Hicks-neutral increase in gross output
productivity by a ratio of A means that the production function becomes AF(L,X), so that the net output
changes by AF (L,X) − X. In constrast, a neutral increase in producivity of net output would change the
production function to AF (L,X) − AX. The interpretation of the latter is rather odd: with A =1 .1,t h e
ﬁrm can produce 10% more gross output, but has also become 10% less eﬃcient at handling inputs. This is
one reason why it is conceptually easier to think about productivity in the gross output function.





The JS composition of the workforce eﬀect is in the term ϕ(t)=A + B · JSt, while the
eﬀect we focus on in this paper is the σFt term. Put diﬀerently, the JS variable is about the
ampliﬁcation of primitive shocks, while our variable is about the primitive shocks themselves.
To investigate (32), we run the panel regression:




+ χt + εct (33)
That is, we return to the cross-country exercise above, this time including the JS measure of
t h el a b o rf o r c es h a r eo ft h e“ v o l a t i l ea g eg r o u p ”i ne a c ho fo u re c o n o m i e s ,JSct. The inclusion
of this measure shortens our sample somewhat as it extends only to 1999 (and only begins in
1979 for the case of the UK). We also include an interaction term; to lessen orthogonality, we




. Finally, we run
this regression with and without a linear time trend χt. Table 5 reports the results.
Both coeﬃcients β and γ are positive and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. The interaction
term has the expected sign but is insigniﬁcant, perhaps due to the lack of power to detect
second-order terms. We conclude that the JS labor supply elasticity and the fundamental
volatility are both relevant to explain the cross-country evolution of business cycle volatility.
6.3 Time-Varying Tail Risk in the Aggregate Economy
Recent events have forced economists and policy makers to reassess the mid-2000s belief of an
ever more stable economy, and to update the probability of large ﬂuctuations, or tail events,
in aggregate GDP growth. For example, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) state that
“the great moderation led too many (including policy makers and regulators) to understate
macroeconomic risk, ignore, in particular, tail risk and take positions [...] which turned out
to be much riskier after the fact.” In this section, we ask whether, from the vantage point of
our fundamental volatility construct, this understatement of tail risk was warranted.
We use our equation 




Yt ·  Ait,w i t hμ =4 .5. For each time period, we feed
the corresponding Domar weight vector and perform 10,000 draws of independent sectoral
TFP shocks, normally distributed with mean zero and where the variance of each sector’s
TFP growth is ﬁxed at its full-sample empirical estimate. We then compute the probability of
having that year’s GDP growth below −1.64σGDP,w h e r eσGDP is the model-implied average
volatility of aggregate GDP for the full-sample period. The value 1.64 is chosen so that, if
the volatility is constant, the tail probability is 5% (P (X ≤− 1.64) = 0.05 if X is a standard
31normal). We then repeat this for all time periods and obtain “tail risk probabilities” from
1960 to 2008.




















































Figure 6: Tail Risk Probability. This ﬁgure plots for each year the probability of negative GDP
growth in excess of 1.64 standard deviations, taking as given the level of fundamental volatility.
Figure 6 reports the result. The overall sample mean of tail risk is 0.051, very close to
a prior of 0.05. Not surprisingly, tail risk follows the dynamics of our fundamental volatility
measure.
Tail risk was reduced fourfold during the great moderation, from the high watermark of
0.11 in 1980 (implying a large ﬂuctuation every 9 years) to a low of 0.028 in 1994 (a large
ﬂuctuation every 36 years). Tail risk has been on the rise since the mid 1990s, reaching 0.07
in 2008 (a large ﬂuctuation every 14 years), roughly the same probability observed in the late
1970s. We conclude that, while the great moderation did imply a marked decrease of tail risk
in GDP growth, larger (negative and positive) events were to be expected by the mid 2000s.
Note that this tail-risk measure does not inform us of the fragility of aggregate growth to
tail events in particular sectors of the economy. To explore this alternative notion of fragility,
or conditional tail risk, we consider what would have happened if a given sector had suﬀered
a two-standard-deviation shock to its TFP growth rate.24 Given the recent focus on risks
posed by the “shadow banking system,” we focus on a particular ﬁnance sector in our sample:
non-depository ﬁnancial institutions (including security and commodity brokerage services
24To be precise, we implement the following procedure. Deﬁne Σ to be a diagonal matrix with non-zero
entries given by each sector’s (full-sample) variance of TFP growth. Let B =Σ 1/2, and deﬁne Gt = BXt,
i.e., Git =

j BijXjt.L e tj∗ be the index of the particular sector we are interested in exploring. Then, the
procedure is: simulate Xjt i.i.d. with zero mean and unit standard deviation for j  = j∗, and set Xj∗t = −2
(for a shock equal to two standard deviations). Then, compute Git = BXt, and ﬁnally TFP. We repeat this
for every t from 1960 to 2008, feeding in the actual Domar weights.




















































Figure 7: Tail Risk Probability and Fragility to the Non-Depository Financial Sector. This ﬁgure
plots for each year the probability of negative GDP growth in excess of 1.64 standard deviations,
given two-standard-devation shocks to the ﬁnancial sector.
and investment banks). Figure 7 shows a dramatic rise in the exposure of the aggregate
economy to tail events in this sector. By 2008, the probability of a large negative event in
GDP conditional on a negative tail event in this sector reaches a peak of 17.3% (or one every
six years). While, by deﬁnition, the conditioning event is a rare one, we note that the fragility
of the aggregate economy to any such event in this sector had been unprecedentedly high since
the late 1990s: the 1998-2008 average is 14%.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have investigated the explanatory power of “fundamental volatility” to understand the
swings in macroeconomic volatility, and found it to be quite good. Fundamental volatility
explains the great moderation and its undoing. It has a clear economic foundation and has
the advantage of being easy to measure.
Our ﬁndings do support the view that the key to macroeconomic volatility might be
found in microeconomic shocks. This is a meaningful, nontrivial empirical result: many other
factors (e.g., policy, taxes, globalization) change the structure of the economy, so it is not
clear a priori that the microeconomic composition of the economy would have such a large
explanatory power.
Of course, microeconomic shocks need to be enriched by some propagation mechanisms.
Their identiﬁcation might be simpliﬁed if we think that microeconomic shocks are the primary
factors that are propagated. For instance, we do not deny that monetary shocks may be
important. However, they may largely be part of the response to other shocks (e.g., real
33shocks caused by oil or ﬁnance).
Our ﬁndings pose the welfare consequences of the microeconomic composition of an econ-
omy. In models with ﬁnancial frictions, a rise in volatility is typically welfare-reducing. Per-
haps ﬁnance was too big and created too much volatility in the 2000s? Perhaps the oil-
dependent industries were too big and created too much volatility in the 1970s?
In addition, fundamental volatility can serve as an “early warning system” to measure
future volatility. In retrospect, the surge in the size of ﬁnance in the 2000s could have been
used to detect a great source of new macroeconomic volatility.
In any case, we think that fundamental microeconomic volatility is a useful theoretical and
empirical concept to consider when thinking about the causes and consequences of aggregate
ﬂuctuations.
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A Data Appendix
US data. The main data source for this paper was constructed by Dale Jorgenson and asso-
ciates,25 and provides a detailed breakdown of the entire US economy into 88 sectors. The data
is annual and covers the period between 1960 and 2005. The original sources are input-output
tables and industry gross output data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
25The data set is available for download at Dale Jorgenson’s Dataverse website,
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jorgenson.
37Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data are organized according to the KLEM methodology
reviewed in Jorgenson, Gallop, and Fraumeni (1987) and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005).
In particular, the input data incorporate adjustments for quality and composition of capital
and labor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most detailed (balanced) panel coverage
of US sectors available, oﬀering a uniﬁed data set for the study of sectoral productivity.26
In this data set, for each year-industry pair, we observe nominal values of sectoral gross
output, capital, labor, and material inputs supplied by the 88 sectors (plus non-competing
imports) as well as the corresponding price deﬂators. Following Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh
(2008) and Basu et al. (2009), we concentrate on private sector output, thus excluding services
produced by the government, but including purchases of private-sector goods and services by
the government (a robustness check shows that this does not materially aﬀect our result). We
also exclude from the analysis the imputed service ﬂow from owner-occupied housing.27 This
yields a panel of 77 sectors which forms the basis of all computations.
Finally, to construct aggregate output volatility measures, we obtained quarterly real GDP
data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
International data. For UK, Japan, Germany, and France we resort to the EU KLEMS
database (see Timmer et al. 2007 for a full account of the data set). As the name indicates,
this database is again organized according the KLEM methodology proposed by Jorgenson
and associates. To preserve comparability, we focus on private sector accounts by excluding
publicly provided goods and services. We thus exclude sectors under the heading "non-market
services" in the data set. These also include real estate services as the database does not make
a distinction between real estate market services and the service ﬂow from owner-occupied
residential buildings (see Timmer et al. 2007, Appendix Table 3 for deﬁnitions and discussion).
For each country we obtain a panel of nominal sectoral gross output and value added at
the highest level of disaggregation possible. For the UK we end up with 66 sectors, Japan 58,
Germany 50, and France 46. For roughly half of these sectors we can compute TFP growth
from the gross output perspective. We then compute the average (across sectors) standard
deviation of TFP growth during the entire sample period. For UK, Germany, and France the
resulting panel runs from 1970-2005. For Japan it starts in 1973 due to the unavailability of
earlier data.
26The NBER-CES manufacturing database provides further detail but only includes manufacturing indus-
tries. As made clear in the paper, it is crucial to account for the growth of service sectors when looking at
cross-sectoral diversiﬁcation, the great moderation and its undoing.
27Finally we drop two sectors for which there are no data in the original data set, “Uranium Ore” and
“Renting of Machinery.”
38To obtain aggregate output volatility for these four countries we extended the quarterly
GDP data in Stock and Watson (2005) till 2009:Q4 with data from the OECD Economic
Outlook.
B Proof Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : The lemma makes two claims: the Cobb-Douglas form and the Hulten
formula. We start with the Cobb-Douglas form. The Lagrangean is































Deﬁning Ii = K
−α
i Lα
i , the aggregate factor input in sector i,a n dI =


























































so that I = K1−αLα. The production function is homogenous of degree 1 in (Ii,X ij):i fap l a n
(C,I i,X ij) is doable, so is a plan (λC,λIi,λX ij). Hence, the production function has a form
Y = I · Λ(A)=K1−αLαΛ(A).







































Proof of Proposition 1 The planner’s problem is maxK,LΛK1−αLα − L1+1/ϕ − rK.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to K and L give: (1 − α) Y
K = r, αY
L =( 1+1 /ϕ)L1/ϕ,
































Finally, Y = kΛ
1+ϕ













39P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 In this model, value added is proportional to sales, Yi = bSi









































and f = N/σ2
Y =1−D/σ2
Y. Consider ﬁrst the case where most shocks at the microeconomic
level are idiosyncratic, i.e., β
2σ2
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Y.T h e n ,
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We verify numerically that the approximation (35) is quite good. Likewise, the comovement
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C Additional Derivations
Proof of Proposition 2 We found it useful to state a general proposition with an
arbitrary number of ﬁxed and variable factors. We call F the primitive factors (e.g., labor
and capital) and F∪X the set of all factors — the primitive factor and the intermediary inputs.












with κ =1 /

bb (1 − b)
1−b

,w h e r es e c t o ri produces a quantity Qi using Fif of factor f ∈F







w h e r ew ed e ﬁ n eγf = bαf for f ap r i m i t i v ef a c t o r ,a n dγf =( 1− b) for f the intermediary
input. Using this notation, the intermediary inputs in sector i are Xi = FiX.
For instance, in the economy studied in Section 5 there are three factors:
(Ff)f=1...3 =( Labor,Capital,Intermediary inputs)=( L,K,X)




f=1...3 =( αb,(1 − α)b,1 − b).W ew i l lc a l li tt h e“ 3 - f a c t o re c o n o m y . ”
Each factor Ff has a cost CfF
1/ξf
f for a constant f. In the the 3-factor economy, 1/ξ1 =
1+1 /ϕ, i.e., ξ1 = ϕ/(1 + ϕ). On the other hand, as the cost of the intermediary good X is
linear in X, ξ3 = C3 =1 . If capital is elastic in the short run, ξ2 =1and C2 = r;i fi ti s
completely inelastic, ξ2 =0in all results below.
GDP is output net of intermediary inputs: Y = H − X = H −























41Finally, as in the body of the paper, a fraction νf of a factor f is ﬂexible in the short run.
We start with a general proposition.





(18)-(19). Furthermore, suppose that each unit i receives a productivity shock 
 Ai. Macroeco-























Employment of factor f : 
 Ff = ξf 
 Y (41)






Microeconomic-level variables change according to:
Dollar sales : 
 Si = β 
 Ai + Φ
 Y (43)
Production : 
 Qi = ψβ 
 Ai +( 1− ψΦ) 
 Y (44)
Price : 
 pi = −(ψ − 1)β 
 Ai +( ψ − 1)βΦ
 Y (45)
Employment of factor f : 






Use of intermediary input : 






































Share of factor f × Adjusted supply elasticity of factor f

where f ∈F∪X denotes the primitive factors (labor, capital) and also the intermediary input
X.
42P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 Step 1. Frictionless equilibrium. The price of unit i is pi = ∂H
∂Qi,















Si. H is the sum of sales in the
economy.
Unit i solves: maxFif piQi −

f wfFif,w h i c hg i v e s :Fif = Siγf/wf ∝ Si.W e u s e ∝
to mean that the variables are proportional, up to a factor that does not depend on i.S o ,
S
ψ
i ∝ Qi ∝ AiSi by (15), so Si ∝ A
1/(ψ−1)




i , and using the adding up
constraint

Fif = Ff, we ﬁnd the constant of proportionality: Fif = FfA
1/(ψ−1)
i /B.P l u g g i n g
this in (38), we obtain H = κBψ−1 
f∈F∪X F
γf



















as announced in the statement of Proposition 5. In the 3-factor economy we obtain (17). Also,
Y = H − X = bH.
Step 2. Changes, assuming νf =1 . To keep the proof streamlined, we ﬁrst consider the
case νf =1 , i.e., the case with no frictions in the adjustment of labor, and with the possibility
that

f γf is not 1. TFP growth comes from (18), and is also Hulten’s formula. Y = bH
gives 
 Y = 




f ,f o rc o n s t a n t sCf.H e n c e
γfY/Ff = CfF
1/ξf−1
f ,a n dFf = Y ξf times a constant, and
 Ff = ξf 
 Y (50)
Equation (49) implies that:




















f αfξf.T h ew a g ei swf = 1














It is convenient that one can solve for changes in the macroeconomic variables without revis-
iting the sectors’ decision problems.
43We now turn to the unit-level changes. Optimization of the demand for labor gives wfFif =
γfSi,s o

 Fif = 






We have, from (15),



































Eq. (48) gives 
 Qi = ψ
 Si +( 1− ψ) 
 H,a n du s i n g
 Y = 
 H,
ψ
 Si +( 1− ψ) 
 Y = 




































































 Qi = ψ
 Si +(1− ψ) 
 Y , we obtain the announced expressions for 




 Fif = 
 Si − 
 wf. Si was deﬁned as Si = piQi,w h i c hg i v e s
 pi = 
 Si− 
 Qi.
Step 3. With general νf ∈ [0,1]. After the changes 
 Ai,o n l yLV,i can adjust. The planner
























Hence, we have (50) and (51).































44Remember that (22). Then, the expression for employment stemming from the optimization
of labor demand becomes:












































This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 We apply the results from Proposition 5. We particularize them
to the case of ﬂexible capital (ξ2 =1 ,ν2 =1 )and ﬂexible intermediary inputs (ξ3 =1 ,ν3 =1 ),
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 Equation (30) comes from (25) and (29). The measured change
in productivity is (using




































so the volatility of measured TFP, σ
Full,m














the other hand, the measured productivity using only the diagonal terms is σm
F = cAσF by

























45D Some Additional Empirical Results
D.1 Including the Covariance Terms
Here we expand a bit on σFull

























Ft should be, essentially by construction, the volatility of TFP. The advantage
of this construct, though, will be to do the following thought experiment. Suppose that the




does not change, how much
should GDP volatility change? Figure 8 shows the “fundamental volatility” graph including
the full covariance matrix, i.e., accounting for cross terms.











































Figure 8: Fundamental Volatility (Full Matrix) and GDP Volatility. The squared line gives
the fundamental volatility drawn from the full variance-covariance matrix of TFP (4.5σFull
Ft ,
also demeaned). The solid and circle lines are annualized (and demeaned) estimations of GDP
volatility. The solid line depicts rolling window estimates of the standard deviation of GDP
volatility. The circle line depicts the HP trend of the instantaneous standard deviation.
Table 6 shows that the results of Table 1 hold also with σFull
Ft ,t h eR2’s are actually a bit
higher. The advantage of σF, with only the diagonal terms, compared to σFull
F , which has
46Table 6: GDP Volatility and Fundamental Volatility
Annual Data- σRoll

























Notes: Regression of GDP volatility on fundamental volatility. We regress σYt= a+bσFull
Ft +ηt
on fundamental volatility. In parentheses are t-statistics and standard errors.
both diagonal and non-diagonal terms, is that σF is easier to interpret (volatility coming from
independent shocks) and requires less data, so it is easier to apply to non-US countries (where
the data are sparser, and we replace all variances by a constant and all covariances by 0).
D.2 Technological Diversiﬁcation Patterns
Recall that, in the construction of our fundamental volatility measure, the only time-varying
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Sit is sector i nominal gross output in year t and Yt gives the total (nominal) value added
for the private sector economy in year t. While Domar weights do not sum to one — as
gross output at the sector level exceeds sectoral value added by the amount of intermediate
input consumed by that sector — this measure is akin to the more usual Herﬁndahl indexes
of concentration. In particular, looking at the cross-sectional (uncentered) second moment to
characterize dispersion/concentration in technology loadings is still valid. The graph below
shows the evolution of this measure for the US.
From the peak in 1960 to the through in 1997, there is a 33% drop in the HD
t measure.
These dynamics are key to explaining the evolution of our fundamental volatility measure.
As such, it is important to perform a number of robustness checks and conﬁrm that the same
pattern obtains: i) in more disaggregated data and across diﬀerent classiﬁcation systems, ii)
for diﬀerent dispersion/concentration measures, and iii) for value-added shares.

















Diversification in Domar Weights
Figure 9: Evolution of HD
t , 1960-2008
D.2.1 More Disaggregated Data
First, we look at the raw BLS data underlying much of the construction of Jorgenson’s data
set. These data are both deﬁned at a more disaggregated level and according to diﬀerent
classiﬁcation systems. Namely, we source two diﬀerent vintages of BLS “interindustry rela-
tionships” data (i.e., Input-Output data). The ﬁrst is based on SIC classiﬁcations (a mixture
of two and three digit SIC sectors) running from 1977 to 1995 for a total of 185 sectors. The
second is the latest vintage produced by the BLS, based on the newer NAICS classiﬁcation
system, and runs from 1993-2008 (for a total of 200 sectors).
Based on these data, we calculate the implied Herﬁndahl-like measure. Note that, given the
diﬀerence in underlying classiﬁcation systems, the levels are not comparable, neither among
themselves nor with the ones reported above. Nevertheless, the dynamics seem to be in broad
agreement with those above: a fall in technological concentration in the late 1970s and early
1980s and, if anything, a stronger reversal of this pattern from the late 1990s onwards.
D.2.2 Checking Against Other Dispersion Measures
Though directly relevant to the story of this paper, Herﬁndahl indexes of concentration are
not the only dispersion measure. However, looking at alternative measures of concentration,
such as the Gini Index, the broad story is unchanged: there is a decline in concentration for
both measures up until the early 1990s, followed by re-concentration from the mid to late
1990s where the latter now shows up much more strongly.
The patterns above are robust to other measures of dispersion: cross-sectional standard
deviation; coeﬃcient of variation; max-min spread and max-median spread.




































DOMAR WEIGHT HERFINDAHL, TWO VINTAGES OF BLS DATA
Figure 10: Herﬁndahl Measure for Domar Weights Computed from Two Vintages of Raw BLS
Data (1977-1995 SIC Data; 1993-2008 NAICS Data)





















GINI INDEX FOR DOMAR WEIGHTS
Figure 11: Gini Index for Sectoral Domar Weights





























Diversification in Value Added Shares
Herf
HP(100)
Figure 12: Herﬁndahl Index of Sectoral Concentration from Value-added Shares Data from
1960-2005.
49An alternative is to look into diversiﬁcation patters in sectoral value-added shares where
the corresponding Herﬁndahl in year t, HVA
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nominal value added in sector i in year t. Figure 12 depicts the evolution of this index and
the corresponding HP-ﬁltered series.
Again, looking at value-added shares leads to the same U-shaped pattern. We also see
that, quantitatively, the peak to through movement in the value-added Herﬁndahl is smaller.
This is as it should be: manufacturing technologies are relatively more intermediate input
intensive. As such, the gradual move away from manufacturing and into services implies
that the Domar weights-based measure of concentration fell relatively more than the value
added one: not only has economic activity relied more on what were initially small — in a
value added sense — sectors but these latter sectors have relatively lower gross output to value
added ratios.28
28A way to conﬁrm this is to regress the average growth rate of each sector’s value-added share on the
average weight of intermediate input purchases in sectoral gross output (average over the entire sample period
1960-2005). We obtain a negative and signiﬁcant slope coeﬃcient.
50